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MANAGEMENT OF THE NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES:
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES
JAMES A. CRUTCHFIELD*
INTRODUCTION
The fisheries of the North Pacific have two characteristics that make
them of great interest to the fishery scientist and the economist. They
are enormously valuable; and the ecology of the area is enormously
complex. Because the stakes are high indeed, it is of supreme impor-
tance that the nations exploiting the living resources of the northern
Pacific Ocean integrate their fishing activities in a way that permits
the maximum possible contribution to human welfare from the stocks.
The physical parameters of the exploitable fish stocks in the North
Pacific and the market value of the species found there are such that a
major expansion in total fishing effort is to be expected. Several of the
most valuable fisheries in the area are already under intensive man-
agement by international authority. These resources and others not
yet subject to specific regulation are also the object of continuing study
by scientists of the United States, Canada, Japan, and the Soviet
Union. It is abundantly clear that some types of international man-
agement of fishing activities must be undertaken if a chaotic and
economically indefensible wastage of resources is not to ensue, but the
regulatory problem is complicated in every conceivable way. The
commercially important fishery resources are not physically or ecologi-
cally separated. The nations involved have different economic and
social value systems and radically different cost and market preference
structures. Neither the traditional law of the sea nor the provisions
of the 1958 Geneva Conventions provides definitive guides to a poten-
tial organizational framework. And all four countries have been reluc-
tant to accept the fact that one of the main issues-the division of the
catch among the participants--cannot be resolved by scientific re-
search.
In this paper, we attempt to narrow the areas of conflict by specify-
ing more precisely the objectives of fishery utilization (and, inferen-
tially, of fisheries management) in the North Pacific, and by analysis
of the extent to which the optimal combination of regulatory measures
in a theoretical framework must be modified to accommodate the
* Professor of Economics, University of Washington. B.A., 1940, M.A., 1942,
UCLA; Ph.D., 1954, University of California (Berkeley).
E2831
U4ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
technological, administrative, and political complexities that beset an
international fishery. The basic bioeconomic theory of an ocean fishery
is modified to show its application to a typical case involving inter-
dependent exploited species and international differences in market
prices of both inputs and end products. The analysis is then cast in
terms of the specific situation in the North Pacific. Alternative con-
cepts of international regulation are examined from the standpoint of
their economic repercussions, and recommendations are formulated
for a longrun management program designed to yield continuing eco-
nomic benefits as well as physical protection of the resources. At-
tention is centered on the Northeast Pacific, where the four major
fishing powers are all actively engaged and in direct competition. The
emphasis throughout is on what should be attempted rather than on
what can be accomplished under present institutional and legal ar-
rangements.
The fisheries of the North Pacific have several economic character-
istics that affect both the performance of the national fleets and the
requirements for effective international management. First, they exhi-
bit the characteristic instability of production typical of all high seas
fishing. Despite continuing progress in scientific research techniques
and data accumulation, the yield capabilities of the resources cannot
yet be defined with any precision. In the case of the anadromous
Pacific salmon-now the most valuable of the stocks-the tendency
toward continuous shortrun disequilibrium in the biological sense
makes it even more difficult to forecast the relation between fishing
effort and catch, currently and in future cycle years. Analyses of the
effects of fishing mortality are further obscured by the vast areas to
be surveyed and severe weather conditions.
The physical setting of the fishery also dictates a highly capital-
intensive operation for some species. Much of the American and
Canadian effort in the area is carried on by relatively small vessels,
but it is centered on salmon, halibut, and king crab and is highly
seasonal. A high seas fishery operating throughout the year would
require the use of large seaworthy vessels capable of operating over
longer periods of time, in a difficult marine environment, at a con-
siderable distance from major shore-based support facilities.
I. FOUR DIVERGENT NATIONS Go FISHING
The most distinctive economic characteristic of the North Pacific
fisheries stems, however, from the complexity of the conflict of national
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interests in the region. Though fewer nations are involved than in the
Northeast and Northwest Atlantic fisheries, the sources of discord are
equally numerous and-thus far-equally intractable.
The physical aspects of the North Pacific fisheries have been de-
scribed in detail elsewhere and need not be repeated here. It is im-
portant to emphasize, however, the economic dimensions of the re-
source from the broader regional and international point of view. As
indicated in the table below, the total tonnage landed from the area by
the Japanese and Soviet fleets is much larger than that taken by
American and Canadian operations. The higher unit value of the
Canadian and American catch reflects the concentration of the fisher-
man of these countries on relatively high priced species (primarily
salmon, halibut, sablefish, and king crab), while the bulk of the Jap-
anese and Russian catch consists of lower priced demersals.
Landings from Northeastern Pacfic and Bering Sea
1960-1965
(thousands of metric tons)
U. S. a  Canada Japanb USSRC
1960 236 152 465 800
1961 265 289 647 1,050
1962 276 312 534 1,100
1963 274 351 372 1,300
1964 296 324 470 INA
1965 312 285 473 INA
a Oregon, Washington and Alaska.
b Excludes high seas salmon catch.
c Total North Pacific and Bering Sea landings.
Sources: U. S. and Canadian from unpublished tabulation by U. S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Montlake Laboratory, Seattle, Washington.
Japanese from INTERNATIONAL NORTH PACIC FISHERIES CommIssIo, 1966
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK.
U.S.S.R. from Armstrong, Soviet Sea Fisheries Since the Second World
War, 13 TnE POLAR RECORD, No. 83 at 158 (1966).
With respect to the economic importance of these resources, the
figures speak for themselves. At present levels of exploitation, the
North Pacific fisheries stocks make a significant contribution to protein
food supplies, regional incomes, and-in the case of the Japanese and
Canadians-to foreign exchange earnings. While salmon and halibut
are already fully utilized, the aggregate groundfish resources of the
region should provide a basis for further expansion.
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Without elaborating the matter further, the essential point is clear:
the present level of output, and additions that may be expected in the
future, make the fishery resources of the North Pacific an asset well
worth managing efficiently. While none of the nations concerned will
face dire economic peril if the performance of the industries exploiting
these resources falls far short of economically optimal levels, the losses
would not be trivial. Despite the acknowledged difficulty of intro-
ducing economic parameters into the machinery of international fish-
ery management, the profile sketched above suggests that the alter-
native is likely to be a serious decline in regional and national eco-
nomic welfare.
What is the basis of the assumption that active management of the
fishery resources of the North Pacific is required, in the near future if
not at present? Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer to the
question of the potential harvest of the sea-nor is there likely to be.
If the question is cast in the more meaningful terms of an economic
supply function, it seems likely that the cost of generating new supplies
is likely to turn upward sharply in the vicinity of 80,000 to 100,000
metric tons per year-at perhaps double the present level of landings.1
Further increases in output can no longer come from simple geographic
extension of known techniques for known types of market but will
require different methods of processing, modification of consumer
tastes and preferences, and technological breakthroughs in methods of
locating and harvesting fish.
At the same time, world demand for fishery products is likely to
expand significantly in the foreseeable future, despite an apparent
tendency in wealthier economies for declining per capita consumption
of fish at higher income levels. As Christy and Scott point out, the
areas in which the income elasticity of demand for fish is relatively
high are also areas in which population is expanding rapidly.2 In addi-
tion, the increasing sophistication of market organization in these
emerging economies will further stimulate the demand for protein food
from the sea and for fish meal.'
'Alverson, Ocean Engineering: Its Application to Harvest of Living Resources
in TRANSACTIONS OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY
AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LIMNOLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY (1965). For a more
optimistic view, see Schaefer, The Potential Harvest of the Sea, 94 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE AMERICAN FISHERIES SOCIETY, No. 2 at 123-28 (1965).
-F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES Ch. 3
(1965). See figure 5, especially.
'See Crutchfield, Marketing as a Constraint on Fishery Development in Tropical
Countries in PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TROPICAL FISHERIES AND
OCEANOGRAPHY, Miami (1965) (at press).
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On balance, then, it seems inevitable that the increasingly severe
pressure on the older, intensively exploited marine fisheries of the
North Pacific will spread to other areas and to other species. As the
relative price of the more desirable species rises, we may expect the
same kind of development that has occurred in marine fisheries in the
past where entry to the fishery is unrestricted and international com-
petition severe: over-exploitation, in the sense of excessive application
of capital and labor to stocks with biologically limited production
capability, with the situation in some fisheries (such as the Pacific
salmon) reaching the ultimate absurdity of increasing investment in
the face of declining total yields.4
No real paradox is the fact that in the North Pacific (and in most
other major ecological units in the marine environment) some species
are exploited to and beyond the danger point while others, capable of
providing perfectly nutritious human food, go unutilized or are fished
very lightly. The existence of underutilized resources does not negate
a need for regulation; on the contrary, it implies a need (honored more
in the breach than in the observance) to devise regulations that will
curtail fishing mortality of the heavily fished species while simultane-
ously encouraging industry to extend its activities to under-utilized
stocks or to less accessible areas.
Accepting for the moment the conclusion that management of the
North Pacific fishery must ultimately be extended to all of the major
species exploited in the area, a series of critically important questions
must be raised. What should be the objectives of management? How
can the different value systems of Japan, Canada, the United States,
and the Soviet Union be integrated in a single set of objectives? What
administrative procedures should be developed for the formulation and
execution of specific policies?
II. OBJECTIVES-AND OBJECTIONS-IN FISEuES MANAGEMENT
If there is any single cause for the confusion that surrounds the
potential and limitations of international fishery management, it is
the astonishing lack of agreement on objectives. Within the scientific
community, at least three different positions find staunch support.
One group steadfastly maintains that the urgency of the world food
'For an overview of this topic see Crutchfield, The Marine Fisheries: A Problem
in International Cooperation, LIV AERICAN EcoNoamc REv., No. 3 at 207-18 (1964).
For illustrations of the magnitude of the problem, see Crutchfield, Overcapitalization
of the Fishing Effort in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, (1967) (at press).
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situation makes a concept of maximum sustained physical yield the
only socially acceptable objectives. A second argues that the concept
of maximum sustained physical yield is both ambiguous and nonopera-
tional under rather common sets of circumstances; they would prefer
the term "optimal yield," with a recognized but unspecified social
and economic content.' A variant of this position holds that while
economic objectives are significant in international fishery manage-
ment, the inability to define a single optimum acceptable to nations
with different economic structures, tastes, and relative factor costs
makes it impossible to reach general agreement on any concept of
optimal fishing broader than a maximizing of the longrun physical
yield.6
The confusion is reflected in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and
Living Resources of the High Seas. There is simply no evidence in the
convention of specific objectives toward which its mechanisms were to
be directed. It would appear that the drafters finally settled on the
term "optimum" without defining it because they were utterly unable
to reconcile conflicting views as to the nature of the optimum sought.
The convention provides both a forum in which international dif-
ferences can be debated and a potentially useful mechanism for resolu-
tion of the debates but since it lacks a statement of objectives and
thus a means of evaluating alternatives, it can lend no form or content
to the debate. Lacking this essential element, it seems unlikely that
the major fishing nations will use (or permit use of) the convention
as a means of formulating and implementing international management
programs, in the North Pacific or elsewhere. It is no happenstance
that only five of the countries ratifying the convention could be con-
sidered important fishing nations.7
Economists have insisted for some time that fishery management
programs, national or international, cannot expect to achieve lasting
benefits for human participants unless the objectives are specified at
least partially in economic terms. It must be remembered, however
trite it may appear, that economic organization is a device for regis-
tering social preferences and for making these choices effective con-
' R. BEVERTOIN & S. HOLT, ON THE DYNAMICS OF EXPLOITED FISH POPULATIONS 357(1957).
6 Schaefer, Biological and Economic Aspects of the Management of Marine Fish-
eries, 88 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AIERICAN FISHERIES SOCIETY 100-104 (1959). The
same argument is raised in many of the papers of W.M. Chapman.
For a fuller discussion of the convention's weaknesses in its application to bio-
logical and economic characteristics of the real world, see Crutchfield, Zones of
National Interest: The Convention on Fishing and Living Resources of the Sea in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SYMPOSIUM ON MARINE RESOURCES (1967) (at press).
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straints on the actions of producers. The general principles involved
are not essentially different for a planned as compared to a market-
oriented economy. In brief, the economist argues that the objectives
of fishing or fishery management cannot be stated in terms of fish
alone. The production of useful goods from the sea, like any other,
requires joint use of labor, capital, and natural resources. In the
simplest possible terms, the objective is to maximize the difference
between total value of yield and total costs. The problem is not only
to choose the proper level of fishing effort but to achieve it at the lowest
possible cost.
III. A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF MANAGEMENT
A very simple analytical model, involving one fishery and one nation
only, will suffice to illustrate the difference between the concepts of
maximum physical yield and of maximum net economic yield. The
device is then expanded and modified to indicate the complications
arising in multispecies and multinational cases such as those of the
North Pacific.
Figure 1 below indicates the traditionally accepted relationship be-
tween fishing effort (shown on the X axis) and the longterm, or steady-
state, physical yield corresponding to each level of effort (shown on
the Y axis). Since the productive capacity of any living population is
limited, the sustainable yield increases at a decreasing rate with in-
creased effort; under conditions typical of most oceanic fisheries, the
sustainable yield will thereafter decline if fishing effort continues to
expand.
Yield
(weight)
Fishing Effort
FIGURE 1. Yield in Weight as a Function of Fishing Effort
1967]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The common sense of this functional relation is straightforward.
At relatively low levels of fishing effort, the fish taken by man include
some that would otherwise have died of old age or fallen to disease or
other predators. At the same time, most of the individual fish taken by
man will not have achieved the full growth of which they are physically
capable. Up to a point, then, potential losses to natural mortality and
to nonhuman predators will exceed the actual losses in incremental
growth, and a positive net yield can be obtained. Beyond that point,
however, the losses in achievable weight are greater than savings in
fish prevented from falling to natural causes and to other predators,
and the total physical yield obtained will actually decline at higher
levels of effort. It should be stressed that for most sea fisheries the
reason for the reduction in yield with excessive fishing effort is not
impairment of the reproductive capability of the stock, but rather the
fact that individual fish are taken before they have realized much of
their potential physical growth. The Pacific salmon is, however, one
of the notable exceptions to this generalization, since its anadromous
characteristics make it perfectly possible for an entire race to be
annihilated by failure to allow adequate escapement to spawning
grounds.
Unfortunately, this formulation tells us nothing of what level of
fishing effort and what corresponding level of catch will in fact be
attained, with or without management. Fishing enterprises are moti-
vated by economic considerations, and there is nothing in the func-
tional relationship between effort and physical catch to indicate the
level at which fishing effort will settle (or the effort at which it should
settle) to achieve some objective of management. Accordingly, in
figure 2 the yield function has been converted to a yield in dollars of
revenue, and fishing effort has been expressed in terms of costs. As
noted in previous discussions, the peculiar common-property status of
a high seas fishery resource leads inevitably to the conclusion that
fishing effort will be pushed to the point where total revenue and total
costs for the fleet are roughly equated--i.e., until costs and receipts of
the representative fishing vessel are just equal, at which point there is
no further incentive for new vessels to enter the fishery or for existing
units to leave.8
It is clear, however, that this is not an optimal economic selection
'For a formal elaboration of this model, see Crutchfield & Zellner, Economic
Aspects of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, 1 FISHERY INDuSTRIAL RESEARCH Ch. 3 and
appendix 1 (1961).
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Y'eld
(Weight)
and Costs
and Recieht
Cost.
Fishing Effort
FIGuRE 2. Yield, Receipts and Costs as Functions of Fishing Effort
for the fishery resource in question. If fishing effort were restricted to
the level at which the difference between total costs and total revenues
is maximized, a clear net benefit (in technical terminology, an eco-
nomic rent) can be obtained. More fish can be taken by pushing
effort beyond the point indicated; but since costs are increasing stead-
ily while revenues are increasing at a declining rate, there must come
a point beyond which additional fish simply are not worth what it
costs to produce them. Maximum physical yield would be optimal
only in the unlikely event that fishing costs are zero.
IV. THE MODEL BECOMES COMPLEX
Unfortunately, ocean fisheries are rarely this simple in structure,
and the straightforward definition of net economic yield as the quan-
tity to be maximized becomes much less pristine in application. In
the North Pacific, the following complications must be faced in de-
fining the best suboptimal management program that might be con-
sidered acceptable by all parties: (1) The fisheries are based on mul-
tiple populations; all interrelate in varying degrees in both biological
and technological terms. (2) Four nations with diverse market pref-
erences, costs, and social value systems compete in the region, and
others may seek to do so. (3) Even if the participants could agree on
a compromise level and composition of fishing effort that yields some
net economic rent, an acceptable method of allocating the economic
benefits must be devised. (4) Individual nations involved may find it
desirable to expand their share of a smaller overall economic yield
19671
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because the degree of mutual interdependence is not completely sym-
metrical-i.e., the power to retaliate is not equally great for all four
participants.
We turn first to the problem of interrelated stocks. What meaning
can be given to "optimal fishing" when the operator exploits more than
one species, each with its own set of functional relations between effort
units? It is not only possible but virtually certain that the level of
effort that maximizes higher physical yield or net economic yield for
a single species will be higher or lower than that required to maximize
output or economic yield from a second or third or fourth species con-
tacted by the same equipment.
This situation may cause severe heartburn to those dedicated to the
principle of maximum sustained physical yield, but it is perfectly
possible to define the combination of effort and fishing equipment that
will maximize net economic benefits, subject only to availability and
accuracy of data on the basic physical yield. There is nothing par-
ticularly startling about the idea that it might pay to "overexploit"
a less valuable species in order to obtain additional income from a
more valuable stock that more than offsets the loss. It might also pay
to exploit a highly valuable species more heavily than one would in
isolation if, in the process, it were possible to obtain very large in-
creases in output of less valuable species (again assuming that the two
are intermingled in such a way that they cannot be exploited and
managed separately).
In short, analysis of the economic yield cost combinations with inter-
locking multiple species would be no more complex in principle than
the analysis of the purely physical yield relations. It would, however,
provide a much more rational basis for choosing the most desirable
mix of outputs available, since both quantity and unit value would be
appropriately weighted in the functions developed. It should be reit-
erated that the problem involved is anything but unique. Many, if not
most, industrial processes generate joint products. The proportion of
each in the total output of the operation can usually be varied, but
only at some cost. Thus, most industrial plants are compromises with
respect to physical efficiency in the interest of obtaining the greatest
economic efficiency-which is, after all, the prime criterion. The
analogy is obvious to an exploited group of fishery resources in which
the same capital equipment can be used to produce varying quantities
of different raw fish products.
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The important point is that the existence of interdependent species
exploited by the same fishing units complicates the empirical problem
of determining an optimal economic level of fishing and the most
efficient gear to be employed; but it presents no more difficulties
analytically than does the single-species case. The fact that individual
species may appear to be over or underexploited in a biological sense
is simply an offshoot of the technological interdependence of the fish-
ery, a situation common to many other industries.
More serious complications arise from the fact that the North
Pacific fisheries are prosecuted by nations with significantly different
cost structures, market preferences, and-with respect to the Soviet
Union---different concepts of economic organization and decision-mak-
ing. The essential economic issue is clearly illustrated in figure 3. The
cost and revenue functions for country B indicate a desirable level of
fishing effort higher than that which would maximize net economic
yield from the fishery for country A if either were free of competition.
The situation is clouded even more if different relative costs of capital
and labor in the two countries dictate preferred fishing techniques for
each that are physically incompatible. In technical terminology, the
use of either of these types of gear imposes on the other country
external costs which would not normally be considered in the decision-
making of that nation. In effect, then, the cost curves for each of the
two countries would actually be higher than if each nation were pur-
suing its own fishing activity independently of the other.
Costs and
R*esp4
(Dlotdrs)
Fishng Effort
FIGURE 3. Optimum Fishing Effort With Different Costs and Prices
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The species composition of the North Pacific fishery leads directly
to conflict among the participating countries. Although all of the
valuable Pacific salmon resources originating in American and Cana-
dian streams are normally fished close to the parent stream, some of
them can be taken fairly readily in certain areas of the North Pacific
by high seas gear. The Japanese have been engaged in an active
fishery, primarily for sockeye salmon, in the area west of longitude
1750 W. to which they were confined by the North Pacific Fisheries
Treaty of 1953. To date, the Russians have not chosen to fish for
salmon originating in Eastern Pacific waters, though there is no legal
barrier to their doing so.
An equally serious conflict arises over the exploitation of the very
large population of demersals on the continental shelf areas of the
North Pacific and Bering Sea. At the moment, demand and cost con-
siderations make it difficult for American or Canadian fishermen to
exploit the lower priced species except in trivial quantities; however,
Pacific halibut, sablefish, and king crab form the basis for two of the
most profitable and healthy fisheries enjoyed by the Pacific Coast
fishermen of both countries. The Japanese and Soviets, on the other
hand, are much more interested in the huge tonnage of lower valued
bottomfish that can be taken by modern trawlers. The conflict is both
an economic and technical one. From an economic standpoint, the
Japanese would much prefer an intensive fishery, using large trawlers
or integrated catching-processing fleets. This type of gear, however,
would be very likely to cut deeply into available halibut stocks. The
technological conflict arises from the incompatibility of semifixed gear,
such as the long lines of the halibut fleet and the crab pots used by
American king crab fishermen, and mobile trawling gear of the type
employed by Japanese and Soviet vessels.
The seriousness of the resulting conflict of interests is accentuated
by the differences in regulatory restrictions imposed on the various
nationals involved. Both Canadian and American fishermen are sub-
ject to very severe regulation of gear and equipment, while no such
limitations apply to their Japanese and Soviet counterparts (with the
exception of the area limitations imposed on the Japanese under the
provisions of the treaty). American and Canadian fishermen are not
allowed to fish for salmon on the high seas with nets, and the halibut
fishery is limited entirely to long lines, despite the fact that trawling
probably would be more efficient in some areas. Limitations on the
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size of vessels employed in the Alaskan salmon fishery also militate
against exploitation of cheaper species of fish, since the designated
maximum size is too small to permit off-season use of salmon vessels
for trawling. It could hardly be expected that American and Canadian
fishermen would view with complacency the operations of well-
equipped, efficient vessels, exploiting the same species or fishing com-
petitively in the same waters, using gear and techniques forbidden to
them.
Finally, the North Pacific fishing economy is complicated by the
diverse objectives of the participating countries. For Canada and the
United States, employment, as well as economic efficiency, is an over-
riding consideration, particularly in Alaska and northern British
Columbia where economically and culturally immobile native popula-
tions are involved. From the Japanese viewpoint (and to some extent,
the Canadian) the question of foreign exchange is critical. Japanese
catches of such species as salmon, king crab and halibut are, in the
aggregate, an important source of foreign exchange, particularly when
sold in processed form. The Soviet Union combines, to a degree that
cannot be estimated, oceanographic research with the fishing activities
of its high seas fleets. In both instances it would be perfectly rational,
given the weighting of these multiple national objectives, for both
Japan and the Soviet Union to regard as optimal a level and kind of
fishing activity that would not necessarily yield maximum economic
benefits, even to themselves.
V. Is THE PROBLEM INSOLUBLE?
No one should or could minimize the significance of these compli-
cating factors. They make it clear that no single pattern of fishing
activity in the North Pacific could possibly be optimal for all partici-
pants, and the resulting conflicts of interest cannot be resolved (though
the areas of difference may be narrowed) by improvement in our
knowledge of the behavior, magnitude, and composition of the marine
populations involved.
In the face of all these disclaimers, is there any point in the economic
analysis of alternative managements arrangements in a broad, complex
area like the North Pacific fisheries?
A number of writers have argued that the inability to define, even in
theory, a unique maximizing situation with respect to the level of fish-
ing effort, gear to be employed, and species to be exploited indicates
19671
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the bankruptcy of the whole idea. They therefore advocate maximum
sustained physical yield as an objective on the ground that it has the
same clear and unambiguous meaning for all participants, and would
assure better economic performance than unrestricted fishing.'
Neither proposition is entirely defensible. It would appear almost
certain, for example, that individual nations with different costs and
market preferences will define maximum physical yield differently be-
cause they will be concerned only with those species that can actually
be caught and marketed profitably, in their own countries or in export
markets available to them. For example, the amount of labor and
capital devoted to fisheries in Alaska could produce very much larger
quantities of perfectly edible fishery products from the North Pacific
if the effort now directed at high-priced salmon, halibut, and crab
were redeployed to take bottomfish. In practice, it is difficult to find an
example of "maximum sustained physical yield" that is not really to
be interpreted as "maximum sustained physical yield of valuable spe-
cies." A value component has been injected into the definition via the
back door, and since it is not specified in a way that permits economic
analysis of alternatives, it could only lead to distinctly suboptimal
management policies. In short, the ostensible simplicity of the sus-
tained-yield objective conceals a host of conceptual and measurement
problems that make it almost completely nonoperational in a multi-
species fishery.
The argument that a single optimum optimorium cannot be defined
where participating nations have different costs and market preferences
is perfectly valid, but it misses the essential point. The real issue is
whether the respective preferences of the participating nations with
regard to level of fishing effort and gear to be employed define a range
of possibilities in which the least acceptable alternative, viewed from
the standpoint of a single nation, is still preferable to what it would
realize under other alternatives. More precisely, is there a range of
alternative levels and types of fishing effort within which each par-
ticipating nation would be better off in economic terms, or could be
made better off by a compensatory payment, than it would be under
unrestricted fishing or alternative management methods that did not
limit total inputs to the fishery? It is argued that this bargaining
range is likely to exist under assumptions reasonable with respect to
most international fisheries, including those of the North Pacific.
' See Schaefer, supra note 6.
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Let us begin with the most elegant (and unfortunately, least likely)
solution to the problem of optimal economic management of the North
Pacific fishery resources. Assume that the fishery is fully interna-
tionalized, and an organization is created with authority to make all
operating decisions on behalf of the four present participants. For
the moment, we exclude any consideration of possible new entrants.
Assume further that the freedom to make operating decisions is con-
strained only by the total budget available to "The Company." Within
limits set by the capital resources and operating funds which the four
nations agree to make available, it is free to purchase inputs from any
source and to dispose of its catch in the most profitable markets.
The solution to the question of optimal level and techniques of
fishing in this case is precisely that of the orthodox textbook. Since
all of the external effects discussed previously have been "internalized"
by creating a single decision-making unit, there are no insoluble prob-
lems of gear conflict, different cost structures, or different patterns of
market preferences. Even differences among the participants with
respect to the weighting of net economic yield versus foreign exchange
earnings could almost invariably be met by some kind of mutually
acceptable trade-off that would leave all nations better off than under
operation by individual national fleets. In effect, each of the alterna-
tives available would be exploited to the point where the incremental
costs of further expansion are exactly equal to the incremental reve-
nues derived. And for each level and composition of catch, all possible
economies of operation through larger-scale units and through different
combinations of labor, capital, and management would have been
achieved. Subject only to the vagaries of wind, water, and unpredict-
able shifts in the physical parameters of the complex environment in
which marine fishery populations live, the agency could maximize the
net economic earnings from the resource within limits imposed by
available knowledge.
There would remain, however, even in this grossly oversimplified
illustration, a problem of distribution that cannot be resolved in purely
economic or scientific terms. Assuming that the fisheries are managed
in such a way as to yield, on the average, the largest net economic
gain possible, how are the proceeds to be divided among the four
participants? To some extent, economic and quasi-economic benefits
would already have been distributed; depending on the extent to which
the employment offered represents an increase in net production over
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what could have been turned out with the same factors in the occupa-
tions, there will be a direct increase in money and real incomes in the
countries from which the productive factors are drawn. Assuming a
reasonably high degree of free trade among the participants and among
the members of the larger international community of which they are a
part, there would still be benefits to all from this distribution. The
really thorny question, however, is the distribution of net benefits
(actually, economic rents) after all factors of production have been
appropriately compensated. Here one can only argue that the bar-
gaining process must bring forth compromise situations such that no
nation feels it possible to improve its absolute economic position by
terminating the agreement and striking out on its own. It seems likely
that a fairly wide range of outcomes acceptable under this definition
would be available, and the actual division of the net rent would be a
matter of negotiating skill, buttressed by historic position in the fish-
ery.
Obviously, these assumptions are extreme to the point of absurdity.
What can be said of the opportunity for mutual economic advantage in
multilateral management of fishing operations in the North Pacific on
the more realistic assumption that each national fleet will retain its
own identity? In short, what happens if we assume that maximization
of world welfare (or even regional welfare) is impractical and that we
must think in terms of national welfare under the national-fleet con-
straint?
VI. NATIONAL INTERESTS ON A COLLISION COURSE
There would appear to be no major conceptual difficulties in ac-
hieving an international fishery management program that would pro-
duce perceptibly better economic performance than unrestricted na-
tional competition if the Northwest Pacific were exploited only by the
United States and Canada, since both have essentially similar demand
and cost structures and the broader social systems of the two countries
are comparable in many ways. Indeed, the success of the joint Cana-
dian-American regulatory programs in the Pacific halibut and Fraser
River salmon fisheries can be attributed in large part to the fact that
both, to a very considerable degree, serve a common North American
market.
The introduction of the Japanese and Soviet fleets raises much more
serious problems. From the standpoint of the Japanese, for example,
[ VOL. 43 : 283
ECONOMICS OF MANAGEMENT
a larger share of a smaller pie in the Northeast Pacific salmon fishery
is an attractive proposition indeed, for if the resource were to be
harvested in anything approaching an economically efficient manner,
all fishing effort would be constrained to areas lying within the terri-
torial waters of the United States and Canada, and Japan would not
participate. As long as the Japanese can harvest salmon on the high
seas at an income in excess of total cost (including her share, if any,
of the costs of management research and protection of the salmon
involved), she will continue to fish. Moreover, the incremental cost of
expanding her share of, e.g., the Bristol Bay salmon catch is extremely
low in terms of subsequent yield foregone, since the greater part of
the burden will be borne by Alaskan fishermen. Indeed, it seems likely
that only the covert threat of retaliatory action in both fishery and
nonfishery fields has kept the Japanese from pushing much harder
than they have for a share of this valuable fishery, with its attractive
potential as a source of hard currencies in international trade.
A similar breach separates the national interests of the Japanese
and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the North Americans on
the other with respect to halibut versus other demersals. There is
nothing irrational about the Japanese and Soviet desire to harvest the
huge stocks of demersals in the region using modern large-scale trawl-
ing equipment. If, in the process, the valuable but quantitatively very
small stocks of Pacific halibut are thereby reduced almost to extinc-
tion, the cost to the Japanese and Russians is doubtless very much less
than the gain achieved in increased harvest of other fish perfectly
acceptable in their markets.
Clearlyj in cases such as these, more than a simple model is required.
At the present time, the United States and Canada simply do not have
the technical capability to force on the Japanese or the Soviet Union
the need for reciprocity by the implied threat of retaliatory penetra-
tion of their territorial waters or of high seas fisheries in international
waters of the North Pacific. From the standpoint of these nations,
therefore, it is difficult to see how mutual agreement on management of
the North Pacific fisheries based on the status quo, would offer any
real attraction. Expressed in other terms, it might pay both the Soviet
Union and Japan to make severe incursions upon the fish stocks of the
Northeast Pacific as a means of forcing the United States and Canada
to yield recognized shares in the catch of the valuable species on which
the North American industry is based.
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The argument above rests on the assumption that the United States
and Canada continue to concentrate only on the high-valued items
(or, putting it less delicately, remain inefficient in terms of large-scale,
continuous, high seas trawling operations). This is neither necessary
nor inevitable. One of the abiding mysteries of America's position in
high seas fisheries has been its inability to compete effectively, despite
an evident trend toward mechanized operations increasingly dependent
upon sophisticated electronic control gear for finding, harvesting, and
handling fish.
With superb industrial technique, ample sources of capital funds,
and diversified and skilled labor pools, both the United States and
Canada have been able to compete successfully in a variety of other
industries that demand very much this same kind of specialization. It
would appear that sufficiently vigorous efforts in the technological and
engineering aspects of high seas fishing operations might suffice to
make both countries effective competitors in the North Pacific demersal
operations. Then, and only then, could it be argued that Japan and
the Soviet Union would stand to gain more by multilateral agreement
than by unilateral extension of fishing activities up to the territorial
limits of the North American continent.
In a very real sense, then, the prospect of rapid expansion of North
American effort on presently underutilized species in the North Pacific
is probably a sine qua non for effective cooperation on the more in-
tensively utilized species for which management is essential at the
present time. There is nothing contradictory in this. On the contrary,
the existence of managed and of underexploited species side by side is
typical of the world's marine resources; the real challenge is to develop
management procedures that permit orderly use of the one without
inhibiting development of the other. If it is assumed that a vigorous
program is mounted to insure North American participation in the
high-volume groundfish operations of the Northeast Pacific, the pres-
sure now evident on stocks of salmon and halibut will undoubtedly be
generalized to cover most of the major species found on the continental
shelf throughout the North Pacific area.
VII. BUT NATIONS ALSO NEGOTIATE
However, economists, like fishery scientists, may have tended to
overemphasize the unique characteristics of internationally shared
fisheries. Useful lessons may be drawn from experience in other areas
in which the need to resolve conflicting national interests in pursuit of
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larger international objectives has become a matter of real concern.
For example, analysis of international river basin schemes indicates,
as suggested above, that in most situations involving the management
of a complex natural resource with a variety of alternative output pat-
terns, it is possible to find a monetary value for each alternative that
permits compensation of any loser or losers out of the gains achieved
from more rational utilization of the resource by all. As Krutilla
points out, even if this basis for agreement is frustrated by a heavy
weighting of nonefficiency or noneconomic objectives by one or more
parties, there still remains the possibility of reciprocity through con-
cessions in an unrelated area.' ° For example, if foreign exchange or
employment considerations are deemed so vital that one (or more) of
the participants in the North Pacific fisheries is willing to sacrifice a
significant amount of the net economic yield that a shared fishery
could produce, then trade concessions involving other commodities
might meet these objections at far lower cost than by a third-best
solution to the fishery management problem.
In an even broader context, Krutilla suggests the possibility-appli-
cable as much to international fisheries as to international river basins
-that an international agency, acting as an intermediary, might be
able to generate an even wider range of compensatory measures than
the participants themselves could provide, again permitting better
management of the fishery from an efficiency standpoint.
To reach this kind of positive negotiation, however, it is imperative
that there be a preliminary agreement on the objectives of manage-
ment, with at least partial acceptance of increased net economic bene-
fit as a prime objective. In addition, effective operation of a mutually
beneficial joint program, backed by a compensation principle, requires
that each nation develop and maintain full confidence that others will
not exploit opportunities to realize net economic gains by grasping for
larger shares of a smaller aggregate net revenue.
Admittedly, these semipolitical boundary conditions are more than
slightly restrictive, but as far as the United States, Japan, and Canada
are concerned they do not appear impossible. Even if the Soviet Union
is specifically included (as it must in the long run), the grounds for
mutual interest in the North Pacific fisheries appear sufficiently great
to make possible the definition of acceptable objectives that will be
adhered to by each participant.
o.J. KRUTMLA, THE COLUMBIARIVER TREATY 5-6 (1967).
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It is also significant that Japan, Canada, and the United States are
engaged in a much wider range of economic and political activities in-
volving mutual advantage and requiring mutual trust. Hence, real
possibilities are evident in Krutilla's suggestions for reaching agree-
ment on the efficient management of one resource, even where non-
efficiency objectives must be sacrificed, by extending the range of con-
cessions to other areas.
One approach to the mechanics of international management of the
Northeast Pacific fisheries may be drawn from experience in the North-
west Pacific and from discussions now in progress on management of
the international fisheries of the North Atlantic. Competitive opera-
tions on Asian salmon by Soviet and Japanese fleets have for sometime
been handled on the basis of national quotas. Since the United States
is not privy to the deliberations, the basis on which the quotas are
determined and-more important-the objectives sought by each of
the two countries are not known in detail. It is apparent, however,
that grounds for agreement do exist despite radical differences in the
economies of the two countries. The Japanese are obviously in a
position to inflict wholesale destruction on certain Asian stocks of
salmon that can be taken on the high seas. While the Geneva Con-
vention on Fishing and Living Resources of the Sea presumably pro-
vides a vehicle for prevention of this sort of destruction, neither the
Soviet Union nor Japan has ratified the Convention, nor is there any
immediate prospect of their doing so. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union is capable of inflicting considerable costs on the Japanese fishing
industry and on nonfishing sectors of the Japanese economy through
other types of pressure. Whatever the motivation, it has been possi-
ble, albeit with long drawn out and apparently somewhat acrimonious
negotiations, to reach agreement on an orderly division of an estimated
total yield that can be taken each year.
Essentially similar reasoning underlies recent studies of possible
regulatory programs for the high seas fisheries of the North Atlantic."
The great cod and haddock fisheries of this area are shared by thirteen
nations, and, though there are a number of separable stocks of fish,
the entire region is linked economically by fast, wide-ranging vessels
capable of fishing in any part of the North Atlantic. Thus far, agree-
ment has been reached only on mesh-size restrictions and other mea-
sures designed to prevent more obvious types of destructive fishing
"See 1965 & 1966 ICNAF ANN. REPs.
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activity. In recent years, however, it has become evident that in-
creased fishing effort, though posing no great threat to the total physi-
cal productivity of the stocks, is not producing any increase in total
landings. Tentative estimates of the situation in various parts of the
North Atlantic suggest that curtailment of fishing effort by 10 to 30
percent would result in new equilibrium catch levels as high as-or
even slightly higher than-at present.
From a purely physical point of view, it would obviously be desir-
able to manage the fisheries of the North Atlantic, area by area, and
(to the maximum possible extent) species by species. Unfortunately,
it would be impossible to devise any effective enforcement procedures
for a management program based on regulation by small area. It
would also be most desirable to limit total inputs to provide the
desired catch at the lowest real cost, but it is impossible in a highly
competitive fishery of this sort to devise measures of physical efficiency
for diverse types of vessel and gear required to develop a program
both equitable and effective.
VIII. Is A NATIONAL QUOTA SYSTEM THE ANSWER?
For these reasons, it seems likely that the most practical alternative
in the North Atlantic would be a system of national quotas extending
over the entire region fished by the large mobile vessels. While this
would, of itself, do nothing whatsoever, by reducing excess capacity in
the fishery, to increase the economic efficiency of the operation, it
would make it possible to do so. Any nation could then take steps to
rationalize its operations by reducing the amount of gear to that
necessary to take its quota over a full fishing season, without fear of
losing ground, relatively or absolutely, to more aggressive competitors.
As the situation now stands, no nation can reduce its effort unilaterally
because the fish foregone would simply be harvested by other nations
with reduced effort, and the resulting increase in catch per unit of
effort, must be undertaken simultaneously by all, else none can afford
to do so.
Under a national quota system of this type, it would also be possible
for a variety of value systems to be accommodated. Nations like the
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and West Germany, whose fleets are
under government control or heavily concentrated in the hands of a
few large firms, would doubtless take steps to insure that their quotas
were taken with levels and composition of effort designed to minimize
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total costs. Excess capacity would either be allowed to depreciate out
over time or, if sufficient returns could be obtained to cover out of
pocket costs, would be redeployed to other fisheries and other regions.
Others, like the United States, Canada, and Norway, might regard
the difficult problems of labor mobility and employment as paramount.
Neither choice would compel others to follow suit.
The analogy to the North Pacific case is obvious. Although the
number of participants is smaller, the same complications exist; and
while the national quota scheme for major species and major ecologi-
cal units is not ideal, it does meet the overwhelmingly important test of
allowing flexibility of adjustment to a regulatory program by nations
with diverse objectives and diverse economic structures. Thus, if the
United States wishes to continue using its quota as a kind of unem-
ployment insurance scheme, it is free to do so without imposing the
same constraint on other nations. Conversely, if the Soviet and Jap-
anese fleets are presently able to utilize species not marketable on the
North American continent, they could do so without permanent ex-
clusion of Canada and the United States from the fishery if these na-
tions subsequently develop the capability to exploit it profitably.
If, then, the nations involved in the North Pacific are willing to
accept a suboptimal solution that combines considerable promise of
permanently alleviating the threat of serious overfishing with a reason-
ably satisfactory resolution of the problem of multiple objectives,
some net economic gain could certainly be realized and-if necessary-
compensation features could be built in to guarantee that there were no
losers even within the fishing industry itself. If the range of alterna-
tives is extended, as suggested above, to include nonfishing conces-
sions in other geographic areas or in nonfishing sectors, the likelihood
seems great indeed of finding ways to offset all adverse effects while
achieving greater overall economic benefits from the North Pacific
fishery than would be possible under unrestricted effort.
One overwhelmingly difficult problem remains. Regardless of the
kinds of measures adopted, if fisheries of the North Pacific (or, for
that matter, of any other major region) are actually managed to pro-
duce a net economic rent-that is, a return over and above all neces-
sary costs of production including a reasonable rate of return on
capital-the situation must certainly attract potential new investment.
We assume that participants in the agreement have undertaken to
prevent this among themselves, at least to the extent of safeguarding
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the quotas of the other nations, or there would be no net economic
benefit to provide the bait. But agreement among existing participants
will not exclude new entrants, and the past decade has demonstrated
beyond doubt that modern ocean-going fishing vessels are capable of
operating anywhere in the world.
IX. THE ABSTENTION PRINCrPLE IN A HUNGRY WORLD
There is no completely satisfactory answer to the problem. On the
one hand, there is powerful support for the view that nations that
pioneered the opening, development, and management of high seas
fisheries should have a priority in exploiting them that extends even to
the right of exclusion. This, in essence, is the abstention principle put
forth by the American and Canadian governments, in respect to
salmon, halibut, and herring of the North Pacific. On the other hand,
it has been pointed out repeatedly that in many parts of the world
generalization of the abstention principle would create problems so
severe as to make its application a mockery of the principle of equity.
Specifically, there are many regions in which major fishing nations are
rapidly expanding their activities in waters contiguous to countries
urgently needing the protein but which presently are unable to muster
the requisite skill and financial resources to participate in high seas
fisheries. By the time these have achieved the necessary technical
competence and capital, they may find themselves barred by rigid
application of the abstention principle from some of the world's most
valuable fisheries-and either denied entrance under any conditions
or admitted only at a serious disadvantage. It is hardly surprisingly,
then, that the abstention principle received scant consideration in
Geneva in 1958 and was entirely ignored in the subsequent draft of
the Convention on Fishing and Living Resources of the Sea.
As in the case of the distribution of net rents from a properly
managed international fishery, there is simply no economic or scientific
basis for resolution of the entry problem. It seems likely that the most
satisfactory solution, in the long run, must be some concession of
access rights up to a specified limit on the part of nations already
participating in a fully utilized fishery. Again, the only rationale for
these nations, which clearly are losers in the process, is that they would
be better off than if the new nations simply forced their way into the
operation with modern equipment. At the same time, there is a dis-
tinct possibility that rights to participate on this basis, if made freely
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transferable, might be used simply to establish a claim or to realize
some monetary value therefrom, rather than for actual participation.
In this case, there might still be a desirable tendency for the bulk of
the harvesting to remain in the hands of technologically efficient na-
tions, while benefits of the operation would be distributed considerably
more widely than would otherwise be the case.
X. SUMMARY AND CONCUSIONS
1. Longrun demand and supply forecasts for marine fisheries in-
dicate intensification of pressures on high valued species taken from
the North Pacific and subsequent extension of fishing pressure to
presently abundant stocks. Present management problems in the
salmon and halibut fisheries may be expected to become general within
the foreseeable future.
2. There is pressing need for a definitive statement of objectives,
for the fishery and thus for management, by the major fishing nations
in the North Pacific. Experience in other areas, together with the logic
of the situation, indicates the bankruptcy of any program tied to
purely physical objectives. A management program couched in terms
of improved net economic yield would encompass both physical and
value parameters and would promise a more useful direction of man-
agement effort.
3. A single management unit, covering all North Pacific fisheries and
free to buy inputs and sell outputs anywhere, could produce a near-
optimal fishery, constrained only by limitations on biological and
technical knowledge and the inevitable variability of the factors de-
termining physical abundance. A fair approximation could be realized
by reciprocal reductions in overcapacity in the salmon and halibut
fisheries and redirection of fishing effort toward other demersals; that
is, control of inputs to produce desired outputs of given species at
lowest cost.
4. Unfortunately, severe constraints on practical management pro-
grams dictate consideration of second-best solutions. These constraints
include marked differences in absolute and relative fishing costs and
market preferences; difficulties in redeploying immobile fishermen,
with attendant emphasis on employment as a national objective; the
need for foreign exchange; and the linking of fisheries with non-
economic objectives, particularly on the part of the Soviet Union, with
its radically different form of economic organization. These constraints
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suggest the need for an overall limit on fishing mortality to protect the
stocks in both a physical and an economic sense, with sufficient flexi-
bility to accommodate multiple and nonidentical national objectives.
A national quota system, for example, would in itself do nothing to
reduce the economic waste that would otherwise develop from a com-
peting race to exploit the North Pacific stocks, but it would make it
possible for those nations willing to make the effort to rationalize their
operations to achieve significant gains.
5. Any multilateral management program in the North Pacific that
could generate net economic benefits would raise two sets of problems
for which no a priori solutions can be derived from scientific or
economic analysis: the division of the net economic benefits and the
method of dealing with potential new entrants. Both sets of decisions
must be negotiated among existing, and perhaps potential, participants,
hopefully under the auspices of an international agency.
6. These difficulties, together with those involved in reconciling the
national interests of the existing participants, can be reduced signifi-
cantly by thorough investigation of possible trade-offs, not only in
fisheries but with respect to other areas of joint interest. In this way,
multiple objectives may be reconciled with less sacrifice in terms of
economic efficiency in the operation and management of the North
Pacific fisheries.
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